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City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
96 S.Ct. 2358 (1976).
N City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.," the United States
Supreme Court held that a mandatory referendum on all zoning changes
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Court decided that such referenda are not delegations of legislative
power, but exercises of the people's reserved power. Therefore, they need
not be accompanied by discernible standards as with delegations of power
to administrative agencies.
In so holding, the Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court,2 which had
held that the charter amendment adopted by the City of Eastlake allowed
the public to exercise arbitrarily and unreasonably legislative power over
zoning regulations. The absence of assurances that the electorate would act
reasonably in accepting or rejecting zoning changes, the Ohio Court held,
constituted the unlawful delegation of legislative power, and violated due
process of law.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Charter of the City of Eastlake
then in effect, Forest City Enterprises, on May 18, 1971, petitioned the
Planning Commission of Eastlake to rezone an eight-acre parcel of property
zoned "light industrial" to multi-family, high rise apartment use. The Planning
Commission approved Forest City's application, which was then submitted
to City Council. On December 28, 1971, the Council amended the city's
zoning ordinance as requested. Meanwhile, an amendment to Article VIII,
Section 3 was circulated by initiative petition, and ultimately placed on the
ballot. On November 2, 1971, the amendment was adopted by the Eastlake
electorate.'
' 96 S.Ct. 2358 (1976).
2 Forest City Enterprises v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
3 The amendment provides in part:
That any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance,
or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations controlling the develop-
ment of land... cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted to the
Planning Commission for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city council
should approve any of the preceding changes... it shall not be effective, but it shall
be mandatory that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of
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Forest City then applied, on April 6, 1972, for a parking and yard
permit, preliminary to obtaining construction approval. The Planning Com-
mission rejected the application since the necessary rezoning had not yet
been submitted to and approved by 55 percent of the electorate as required
by Article VIII, Section 3 as amended. In May, 1972, the voters of Eastlake
failed to adopt the zoning amendment proposed by Forest City by the
requisite 55 percent majority.4
Forest City filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, seeking
declaratory relief. The petition claimed that mandatory voter approval of all
land use changes was unconstitutional by due process standards, and violated
the referendum provisions of the Ohio Constitution.5 Forest City also at-
tacked the super-majority of 55 percent and the provision that the applicant
bear all election costs.' The Court of Common Pleas upheld the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory referendum and 55 percent requirements, but
declared the cost provision unconstitutional. On appeal and cross-appeal
the Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed.7 The Supreme Court of
Ohio granted certiorari and reversed.8
The Ohio Court held that insofar as the charter provision purported
to apply to administrative actions (e.g., granting variances and special use
permits), the referendum power could not be invoked.' However, amend-
ments to the zoning ordinance were characterized as legislative enactments.
Such amendments would be properly subject to referendum unless the East-
lake provision was violative of due process independently. 10 The court deter-
the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake at the next regular municipal election ....
Said issue shall be submitted to the electors of the City only after approval of a change
of an existing land use by the Council for an applicant ....
4 The facts are fully set out in 96 S.Ct. at 2360-61; 41 Ohio St. 2d at 187-88, 324 N.E.2d at
742.
5 OHIo CONST. art. H, §§l,l(f); art. XVIII, §3 (Page 1955).
6 The Court of Common Pleas upheld the requirement of a 55 percent majority; this issue
was not separately addressed in the appellate courts. The determination of the invalidity of
the provision requiring the applicant to bear all costs was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and was not cross-appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 324 N.E.2d at
742.
7 Forest City Enterprises v. City of Eastlake, No. 73AP-263 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County,
July 23, 1973).
8 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
9 Id. at 190, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
10 Id. at 189, 324 N.E.2d at 743. Referendum is properly invoked in relation to legislative
enactments. OHIO CONST. art. II, §§1, l(f). As such, its use to validate or invalidate a legis-
lative amendment would comport with due process. The standard of judicial review of the
referendum would be the same as that for statutes. The statute would be invalid if "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). Thus, the
Ohio Supreme Court sought to establish due process violations as inherent in the operation
and possible effect of the Eastlake mandatory referendum provisions, finding those provisions
unconstitutionally arbitrary. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 191, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
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mined that a reasonable use of property, approved by legislative action,
could not be made dependent upon the potentially arbitrary whims of the
voting public.'1 Referendum, proper for community-wide policy making,
was deemed improper for zoning changes, which usually involve relief of
individual hardship." In a concurring opinion, written by Justice Stern, a
majority of four justices found the Eastlake charter amendment to be violative
of equal protection, as a tool for exclusionary zoning under the guise of
popular democracy." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari"
and in a 6-3 decision upheld the constitutionality of the referendum and
remanded to the Ohio Supreme Court.'"
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice
Burger, is a frontal attack on the reasoning used by the Ohio Supreme Court
to support its finding of lack of due process. Unfortunately, the Ohio Court's
opinion is faultily constructed. The Ohio Court accepted the proposition
that rezoning a single parcel by amendment is legislative action, but then
equated referendum, involving the entire electorate, with localized consent
requirements to establish due process violations. 6 The Ohio Court then
concluded that the lack of standards for the exercise of a referendum per-
mitted the arbitrary exercise of the police power, and thus invalidated the
electors' ability to constitutionally exercise their legislative responsibility."'
The United States Supreme Court first examined the status of referen-
dum in Ohio, and concluded that by express constitutional provision the
people in municipalities reserved the power of referendum "on all questions
which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to
control by legislative action."' 8 Therefore, the characterization of the referen-
dum power as a "delegation" of legislative authority was inherently incon-
sistent. Rather, referendum is a means of direct political participation through
11 41 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
12 Id. at 197, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
1 Id. at 198, 324 N.E.2d at 748 (Stern, J., concurring).
14 96 S.Ct. 185 (1975).
15 On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court, perceiving "no state due process constitutional questions which, under this record, we
would choose to decide in a manner other than mandated by the opinion on remand." Forest
City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 48 Ohio St. 2d 47, 48, 356 N.E.2d 499, 500 (1976).
16 The court relied on the authority of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U.S. 116 (1928) and Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). In both cases, an
ordinance allowing neighbors within a specified distance to set restrictions on reasonable uses
within the area was held to be a standardless delegation impinging upon a property owner's
freedom to use his property subject only to rational legislative regulation.
17 41 Ohio St. at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746. For more detailed analyses of the weakness of the
court's reasoning, see 9 AKRON L. REV. 175 (1975); Comment, Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
v. City of Eastlake: Zoning Referenda and Exclusionary Zoning, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 635
(1975).
18 96 S.Ct. at 2362, citing OHIO CONST. art. II, §1(f). 3
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which the people make final decisions regarding enactments of their repre-
sentative bodies on questions of public policy.19
After characterizing the referendum as reserved power, the Court
readily accepted the Ohio Supreme Court's finding that the power to rezone
is distinguishable from the power to grant relief from unnecessary hardship,
the former being legislative and the latter administrative." Deferring to this
"binding interpretation of state law,"21 the Court found it unnecessary to
examine the accuracy or efficacy of such a categorization of zoning processes,
merely citing supportive decisions of other states." Nonetheless, this determi-
nation is crucial to a finding that a referendum is not an unlawful delegation.
Referendum is a reserved power to be exercised only upon legislative
action. The United States Supreme Court deftly avoided the controversy
over the nature of zoning amendments as legislative" or administrative"
when applied to individual property. In determining that the power of man-
datory referendum is not an unconstitutional delegation, the Court supported
itself with legal sophistry rather than with penetrating analysis of the issues
and facts involved.2"
The Court considered the validity of the Ohio Court's argument that the
lack of standards to guide the voters would subject legislative action to the
capricious whims of the public, resulting in denial of due process. In answer-
ing this allegation, the Court distinguished delegation of power to regulatory
bodies, which requires guidelines," from the exercise of reserved power
inhering in the electorate. The latter power is regulated by the courts as a
legislative function, and is held to a standard of bearing a reasonable rela-
tionship to the rational exercise of the police power in furtherance of the
19 96 S.Ct. at 2361-62.
2 0 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974); Donnelly v.
Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968); Berg v. Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146,
198 N.E.2d 48 (1964); Hilltop Realty Inc. v. South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d
180 (1960); Cf. Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971).
21 96 S.Ct. at 2362 n.9.
22 E.g., Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85 (Ch. 1969).
23 Johnston v. Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958); Dwyer v. City Council, 200
Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927); Denny v. Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
Compare Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So.2d 404 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972), with Andover
Dev. Corp. v. New Smyrna Beach, 328 So.2d 231 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976).
24 Snyder v. Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975); Fassano v. Board of County Comm'rs
264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964);
Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). Compare Kelley v. John, 162
Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956), with Frank v. Scottsbluff, 183 Neb. 722, 164 N.W.2d 215
(1969).
25 See discussion accompanying notes 66-83 infra.
26 96 S.Ct. at 2363, citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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public health, safety and welfare." The Eastlake charter contemplated refer-
ring zoning changes to a vote of all the electorate. Thus, the Court easily dis-
tinguished the decisions invalidating consent provisions restricted to the
immediate neighbors,2s since referendum involves community-wide decision-
making. The Court deemed that James v. Valtierra,"9 upholding mandatory
referenda on public housing, was controlling." The Ohio Court's proffered
distinction of James v. Valtierra as dealing with expenditure of municipal
funds in a federal program rather than with rezoning questions 1 was ignored
by Chief Justice Burger.
However, the significance of Justice Paul Brown's supportive reasoning
in the Ohio decision should not be overlooked. The Ohio Court denied that
most rezoning affects the entire community in such a way as to make its
referability justified as community-wide policy-making. This denial was
a major step toward delineating rezoning in such cases as an administrative
action."2 The Court compared legislation prescribing mandatory referenda
for counties and townships adopting comprehensive zoning resolutions 2 with
legislation allowing referenda only upon petition for subsequent amend-
ments."4 These provisions evidence the legislative determination that amend-
27 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
28 See cases cited note 16 supra.
29 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
30 96 S.Ct. at 2364.
31 41 Ohio St. 2d at 197, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
32 See cases cited note 24 supra. The Ohio Court had stated earlier in its opinion: "Grants
of relief from unnecessary hardship ... are classified as administrative acts, regardless of the
label placed upon them." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 190, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
33 Omio REV. CODE ANN. §303.11 (Page 1953) reads in pertinent part:
If the [comprehensive] zoning resolution is adopted by the board of county commission-
ers, such board shall cause the question of whether or not the proposed plan of zoning
shall be put into effect to be submitted to the electors residing in the unincorporated area
... included in the proposed plan of zoning for their approval or rejection .... No zoning
regulations shall be put into effect ... unless a majority of the vote cast on the issue
in that township is in favor of the proposed plan of zoning.
Orno REV. CODE ANN. §519.11 (Page 1953) applies to township trustees.
34 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§303.12, 519.12 (Supp. 1975) read in pertinent part:
Amendments or supplements to the zoning resolution.., shall [be] set.., for a public
hearing thereon .... If the proposed amendment or supplement intends to re-zone or
re-district ten or less parcels of land... written notice of the hearing shall be mailed
... to all owners of property within and contiguous to . . . such area... The planning
commission shall recommend the approval or denial .... or modification ... to the
zoning commission .... The.. . zoning commission shall ... submit its recommendation
... to the board of township trustees.
The board [shall] ... set a time for a public hearing ... . Such amendment or supplement
adopted by the board shall become effective in thirty days after the date of such adoption
unless within thirty days... a petition, signed by a number of qualified voters... [is
filed] requesting the board to submit the amendment or supplement to the electors of
such area, for approval or rejection .... No amendment ... for which such referendum
vote has been requested shall be put into effect unless a majority of the vote cast on the
issue is in favor of the amendment.
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ments infrequently involve decisions of community-wide policy import.
Therefore, when the Ohio Supreme Court determined that such evidence
supported the rejection of mandatory referenda on all zoning changes, it
could well be held to have decided that the Eastlake provisions were in con-
flict with the general law of Ohio 5 in delineating the scope of reserved
power.36
The United States Supreme Court, however, was content to deal only
with the concrete conclusions as to the legislative characterization of rezoning
and the applicability of referenda to legislative actions. It failed to examine
many of the Ohio Court's inconsistent statements" for guidance in reaching
an understanding of the position of the Ohio Court in regard to Ohio law.
The dissents of Justices Powell and Stevens, on the other hand, dealt
with the result-oriented approach of the Ohio Court's concurrence in
Eastlake, by questioning the purpose and effect of the Eastlake charter
amendment. 8 Without elaboration, Justice Powell distinguished generally
applicable legislation subject to referenda from legislation affecting only
particular property. He concluded that the latter should not be subject to
35 In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), the Supreme Court deferred
to the state interpretation of the scope and validity of its referendum provision in regard to
Congressional districting, finding that the state Constitution and laws made referendum part
of the legislative power. In like manner, it could be argued that the state of Ohio had the
prerogative to determine that the legislative power reserved to the people did not extend to
mandatory direct vote on each aspect of a possibly minor change to a comprehensive enact-
ment.
36 Admittedly, as a home rule municipality, Eastlake was free to establish its own referendum
procedures under OMo CONST. art. II, §1(f). However, when the Ohio General Assembly
promulgated laws for unincorporated townships and counties, it determined that mandatory
referendum on zoning amendments was unnecessary and perhaps an improper use of the
referendum power. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§303.11, 303.12, 519.11, 519.12; notes 33-
34 supra. The Ohio Court, in citing to these non-controlling provisions, evidenced a judicial
determination that such regulation was constitutionally mandated as well. When individual
changes without community-wide repercussions are made, mandatory referendum is an
unauthorized delegation since procedural due process must be assured as for administrative
decisions. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 197-98, 324 N.E.2d at 749. The United States Supreme Court,
in deciding Eastlake, did not take into account this distinction.
37 The Ohio Court determined that actions should be classified on the basis of substance as
individual adjudications, rather than on the form of their nomenclature. 41 Ohio St. 2d at
190, 324 N.E.2d at 743. Then the court stated that its decision dealt simply with the con-
stitutionality of mandatory referendum on legislative actions in zoning. Id. Finally, the court
stated in relation to zoning amendments:
It can scarcely be contended that every proposed land use change, no matter how small,
... either involves or allows community-wide policy-making. Rather, most involve hard-
ships affecting individual parcels or property .... Amendments to rural zoning ordinances
... are not subject to mandatory voter approval, but rather to permissive referendum
elections, when a substantial number of resident voters feel sufficiently aggrieved to
circulate the appropriate petitions... Such provision contrasts sharply with the Eastlake
charter, and thus is free from the deficiencies implicit in an unlawful delegation of the
legislative power. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 197-98, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
38 96 S.Ct. at 2365 (Powell & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 10:3
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/4
referendum because the electorate cannot accord a full hearing to the affected
person to insure fundamental fairness. The disturbing result of allowing local
governments to tread on individual rights through referendum, bypassing
normal protections, is an issue worthy of more discussion and analysis."9
Rather than accepting the bald assertion that zoning amendments are
legislative acts, Justice Stevens pointed out the fundamental differences in
zoning enactments and general police power regulations. Zoning plans cus-
tomarily and necessarily provide for changes based on individual relief,"
0
primarily to ensure the constitutionality of the entire zoning scheme."1 The
difference between the enactment of comprehensive ordinances and the grant-
ing of specific relief by amendment is a major premise of zoning law."
That difference needs to be considered when characterizing council actions
as legislative or functionally administrative. " If the process deals essentially
with adjudication between individual rights in a parcel of property and the
regulations imposed by a comprehensive zoning code, minimal standards of
due process should be adhered to, since a major aspect of due process is the
procedural balancing of individual versus community rights."
Justice Stevens recommended deference to findings by a state court
that a particular procedure is an unreasonable method for handling local
problems." The fact that the individual is not protected when conflicting
policy issues are presented necessitates that a responsible organ of govern-
ment, subject to due process standards, be the arbiter. When the purpose or
effect of the contested law is to provide a tool for excluding low and middle
income families, or merely for making zoning changes burdensome to the
individual seeking them, the conflict of individual rights with the majority
consensus is manifest. Such conflict requires solution only after fair proced-
39 See text accompanying notes 47-64 infra.
40 96 S.Ct. at 2365-66. See also Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973); Kropf
v. Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974); Cheney v. Village 2 at New
Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
41 96 S.Ct. at 2366. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 309 N.E.2d
900 (1974).
42 1 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, §5.02 (1968); 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING
AND PLANNING, Ch. 12, §§1, 2, 5, 6 (4th ed. 1975).
43 See cases cited notes 23-24 supra.
44 In C. Miller Chevrolet, Inc. v. Willoughby Hills, 38 Ohio St. 2d 298, 303, 313 N.E.2d
400, 404 (1974), the court stated:
In each case [determining the validity of denying a variance] there must be a balancing
of interests between the benefits that would flow to the owner of the property if his pro-
posed use were allowed and the benefits to the public health, safety, welfare and morals
that are derived from the existing zoning.
See also Appeal of Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), which advocates
that judicial review of denied changes in zoning ordinances be undertaken when property
owner versus the community interest in the status quo might be in issue.
45 96 S.Ct. at 2368.
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ures have been followed. A determination of lack of due process must rest
upon factual considerations. A state court's knowledge of conditions within
the state relative to land use and zoning is a sound basis for weighing the
fairness of the effect of a particular law. Mandatory referendum creates such
an obstacle to effecting change of limited or individual impact that funda-
mental fairness can indeed be found lacking. Here, in Stevens' view, the
Ohio Court's determination that mandatory referendum deprives individuals
of fundamental fairness should be sustained."
The impact of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Eastlake
may be overwhelming or minimal. The opinion, in accepting state characteri-
zation of rezoning as legislative, would appear to be inapplicable in states
which have held the rezoning of a parcel to be an administrative action.
Inferentially, if the action is administrative, referendum is inapplicable,4 T
and due process standards must be adhered to, subject to judicial review.
However, for those states which have not classified rezoning as administra-
tive, the judicial abdication apparent in the United States Supreme Court
decision might reinforce the majority position that zoning enactments, as
legislative, are to be upheld if their rationality is "fairly debatable." s
If that should happen, the uses to which the zoning power may be put
to restrict both individual property and personal rights may continue despite
the inroads against exclusionary zoning made by state courts which have
considered the problem and its effects in depth. 9 Respondent's brief named
over a dozen communities ringing the Cleveland metropolitan area which
have enacted provisions for mandatory referendum on all zoning changes.50
The United States Supreme Court, in validating such provisions, has enabled
a major exclusionary tool to be used with impunity to halt the expected
urban-suburban growth patterns of this area,51 and perhaps many others.
46 Id. at 2371. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967), wherein the Court deferred
to the California Court's determination that Article I, §26 of the state's constitution was dis-
criminatory based on "the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning.., the
potential impact of §26, and.., the milieu in which that provision would operate."
4 See, e.g., West v. Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Bird v. Sorenson, 16
Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
48 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5 (1974). See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); DeCaro v. Washington Township, 344 A.2d 725 (Pa. Commw.
1975); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
49 See, e.g., De Simone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d
31 (1970) (finding legal arguments against low income housing to be motivated by exclu-
sionary interests); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super 164,
290 A.2d 465 (1972), afl'd, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Concord Township Appeal, 439
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
50 41 Ohio St. 2d at 201, 324 N.E.2d at 749 (Stern, J., concurring).
51 Id.:
The inevitable effect of such provisions for mandatory referendum is to perpetuate the
de facto divisions in our society between black and white, rich and poor .... The exer-
[Vol. 10:3
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Nevertheless, in light of the reasoning adopted by the Court, the prac-
titioner may be able to distinguish away the precedential value of the decision
by advancing an argument based upon the policy and effect of zoning legis-
lation. The necessity of comprehensive planning and the utility of amend-
ments as administrative relief within a zoning plan should be emphasized.
The Court, in failing to come to grips with the effect of the mandatory
referendum on the people themselves, failed to address both a major legal
and social issue. Initially, the purpose and effect of referendum must be
examined to determine if it can be legitimately applied to rezoning by amend-
ment. Then, the character of zoning legislation itself and the import of
amendments dealing with particular parcels of real estate need to be analyzed.
The referendum power is a tool by which the people can rescind an
act of their representative assembly by voting upon legislation themselves."
Referendum, however, cannot be used to deny constitutionally protected
rights.53 The use of referendum, by its very nature, makes enactments or
ordinances "substantially more difficult to secure,"5 and tends to retain "the
status quo existing prior to legislative adoption of the amendatory zoning
ordinance."" The danger that referendum will be used to impose the majority
interest against a valid minority interest56 necessitates some regulation of the
power. The procedural requirements statutorily created are measures desig-
nated to effectuate this protection. "The interest protected ... is the right
of the majority to have the legislation enacted by their elected representatives
to take effect." '
In addition to these considerations, the Ohio referendum provision con-
tained in Article II, Section 1 (d) of the Ohio Constitution expressly exempts
cise of the police power through zoning cannot be permitted where its sole purpose is to
tighten the [exclusionary] noose.
52 See Olson, Limitations and Litigation Approaches: The Local Power of Referendum in
Federal and State Courts-A Michigan Model, 50 J. UR"AN L. 209 (1972).
55 Lucas v. 44th General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
54 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 (1969).
55 West v. Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 476, 221 N.W.2d 303, 312 (1974) (Williams, J., concur-
ring in part).
56 "Wherever the real power in a government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our
Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private
right is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the constituents...." 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904),
quoted in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
57 Omo CONsT. art. II, §1(g); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§303.01 et seq., 519.01 et seq. (Page
1953).
58 Note, Township Zoning Referenda; Sufficiency of Contents of Petition, 33 Omo ST. L.J.
144, 147 (1972). See also Kancler, Litigating the Zoning Case in Ohio: Suggestions to Fill
in the Textbook Void, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 33, 40 (1975): "Automatic referenda of all
zoning decisions seems obviously inconsistent with the concept of representative government."
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emergency legislation, laws providing for tax levies, and appropriations for
current expenses 9 from its operation. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that
the referendum should not be used if its effect will be burdensome despite
constitutional protections. In Shryock v. Zanesville,6" the court cited the
types of laws that would not be subject to referendum under the Constitution.
Further elaborating, the Shryock Court determined that "the test for exempt-
ing a law from referendum should be whether the law is similar in 'character'
to the exemption contained in Section 1 (d) of Article II' '" It can be argued
that such measures as tax levies and appropriations necessary for conducting
the business of the municipality are analogous to zoning amendments neces-
sary for the proper development of the comprehensive plan.6" Each is opera-
tional in nature and necessary to specific implementation of municipal policies.
Submitting zoning changes automatically to the electorate can cause lack
of uniformity in the implementation of comprehensive land use planning
through zoning. 3 "If each change in a zoning classification were to be sub-
mitted to a vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered
inoperative."" Standardless and uninformed acceptance or rejection of
zoning amendments, which are often necessary to meet fluctuating conditions
inherent in growth, can result in arbitrary application of zoning regulations
to individuals.6"
After establishing that referendum may be arbitrarily applied, especially
when zoning considerations are paramount, it is necessary to characterize the
proper use of zoning legislation and amendments. Zoning affects the uses to
which an individual's property may be put; it is therefore subject to the
general requirement that it be in accord with a comprehensive plan.66 The
59 OMO CONST. art. II, § 1(d) states: "Laws providing for tax levies, appropriation for the
current expenses of the state government . .. , and emergency laws . . . shall not be subject
to referendum." This provision does not apply to municipalities.
60 92 Ohio St. 375, 110 N.E. 937 (1915).
61 State ex rel. Bramblette v. Yordy, 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 151, 265 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1970).
62 In San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118
Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) the court compared zoning legislation with property tax rates.
6 3 See Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973),
where an ordinance approved in a referendum was invalidated by a broader initiative amend-
ment to the zoning code in the same election.
64 Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 2, 394 P.2d 808 (1964) (holding that therefore zoning
amendments can only be rationally classified as administrative actions.)
65 96 S.Ct. at 2365 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
As land continues to become more scarce, and as land use planning constantly becomes
more sophisticated, the needs and opportunities for unforeseen uses of specific parcels
of real estate continually increase. For that reason, no matter how comprehensive a
zoning plan may be, it regularly contains some mechanism for granting variances, amend-
ments, or exemptions for specific uses of specific pieces of property.
66See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926). Eastlake Code §1165.02 provides that
Council may change zoning if in compliance with the Master Plan or good zoning practice.
Cf. Cassell v. Lexington Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 N.E.2d 11
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danger of allowing the populace to rule on all changes is that a comprehen-
sive plan will be compromised. 7 The amendments may violate the general
purpose of the municipal policy of zoning. It is the province of the courts
to guard against the tendency to expand the purpose of referenda, and "to
confine this important reserved right of the people to its legitimate and proper
scope, lest, through misuse, it fall into disrepute.""8 The use of mandatory
referenda to halt the necessary growth of communities with exclusionary
effect can certainly cause it to fall into disrepute. The whims of the voting
public or the majority of the community cannot be bowed to in pursuance
of a comprehensive zoning plan, and cannot justify the grant or denial of a
variance or amendment relating to a specific property."0 "[Clonstitutional
law is not a matter of majority vote. . .. [t]he Fourteenth Amendment teaches
that it is personal rights which are to be protected against the will of the
majority."71
Comprehensive plans reflect the major policy of communities in rela-
tion to zoning. Reasonable flexibility and responsiveness to changing condi-
(1955), which interprets the present Section 519.02 of the Ohio Revised Code (the township
zoning enabling provision) to require any and all actions of the township purporting to be
under it to be in accord with a comprehensive plan:
The absence of any comprehensive plan in the regulation involved herein certainly opens
the door to an arbitrary and unreasonable administration of the regulation . . . There
being no yardstick in the regulation by which the zoning commission could possibly be
guided, we can come to no conclusion other than that the commission . . . acted arbi-
trarily and unreasonably....
The fact that standards in administration, assuring rational decisions based on comprehensive
planning, are lacking makes mandatory referendum subject to the same arguments. Id. at 345
127 N.E.2d at 14.
67 Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85 (Ch. 1969).
6 8 West v. Portage, 392 Mich 458, 466, 221 N.W.2d 303, 307 (1974). Accord, Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 581, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973) ("A determination
whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an
exercise of judicial authority."); Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d. 292, 295, 502 P.2d 327,
330-31 (1972):
[Z]oning amendments . . . are sufficiently distinguishable from other legislative functions
to allow administrative standards to be applied to them.... In amending a zoning code...
[the municipal legislative body] in effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought
by the proponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning change.
69 Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Kelley v. John, 112 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d
713:
The administration of the ordinance . . . very rarely affects all the electors of a muni-
cipality.... The uniformity required in the proper administration of a zoning ordinance
could be wholly destroyed by referendum. A single decision by the electors . . . [could
destroy zoning if] in conflict with the general scheme .... Id. at 323, 75 N.W.2d at 716.
70 "inn restricting individual rights by exercise of the police power.... a municipal corpora-
tion. . . can not deprive an individual of property rights by a plebiscite.... Such action
is beyond the delegated power... to pass reasonable ordinances." Benner v. Tribbit, 190
Md. 6, 20, 57 A.2d 346, 353 (1948). See also Homecroft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind. 57, 148
N.E.2d 563 (1958); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968); Kent v. Zoning Board of Review, 74 R.I. 89, 58 A.2d 623 (1948).
71 Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 944 (D. Colo. 1963) (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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tions in the plan are necessary if the policy is to have its desired effect on the
future growth and development of the municipality. The council must logi-
cally develop its plan."2 Congress has recognized that comprehensive planning
must be a cooperative effort of professionals, who can assure that planning
is an on-going process with strategies for implementation and evaluation of
goals achieved.7" Ohio has also embraced the view that zoning should
advance the general public interest in land use planning through plans based
upon analysis of existing land uses and reasonably forseeable needs based
upon such considerations as population, economics, living, and transportation
problems."
The American Law Institute Model Land Development Code requires
that local governments plan in a "socially and economically desirable manner"
in accord with "a system of uniform statewide procedural standards."" The
Code emphasizes long-term planning policies to be effectuated by short-term
goals which are expected to change with conditions."
Rational planning is the basis for the constitutional validity of zoning.
Providing for amendment by submission to the general population, unin-
formed of the multitude of variables necessary to continue rational land use,
is destructive of the entire purpose behind zoning. For this reason, state
courts are increasingly finding the amendment process when applied to a
particular property to be administrative in nature and subject to judical
review.7 The courts insist that the actions of the local council, which can be
administrative as well as legislative,8 be categorized on the basis of substance
rather than form."9 When the council, by charter, ordinance, or statute, is
determining a matter after public hearing and/or determination of suitability
by the planning commission,8" the adjudicatory nature of the process is mani-
fest, and due process must be maintained.81
72 Jablon v. Town Planning and Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 434, 254 A.2d 914 (1969);
Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973).
7 40 U.S.C. § 461 (a), (b), (c) (Supp. V, 1975).
74 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 122.06 (Page Supp. 1976); Grant v. Washington Twp., 1 Ohio
App.2d 84, 203 N.E.2d 859 (1963).
75 ALI, MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 1, § 1-101 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).7O Id., art. 3, § 3-105 and Commentary at 126-40.
77See cases cited note 24 supra. Cf. ALL, MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 2, § 2-312 (Proposed
Official Draft 1975), which subjects amendments limited in effect to one parcel or less than
50 acres to criteria developed for administrative hearings, such as findings and conclusions
based upon the record. The accompanying note explains that the purpose is to provide forjudicial review and scrutiny of land use decisions, dispensing with "automatic" validity.
78 Charter of the City of Eastlake, Art. V, § 10.
79West v. Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). Cf. quotation in note 32 supra.
80 See Charter of the City of Eastlake, Art. VIII, § 3.
81 See Hurst v. Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929). Cf. Driscoll v. Austintown
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Since the decision-making process must be sensitive to individual rights,
since the amendment is merely applicable locally, and since the rezoning is
an application of the general policy of the comprehensive zoning ordinance
to a particular piece of property, the action is administrative rather than
legislative.8 1 If the body passing upon the amendment (applying the zoning
ordinance to the particular property) is legislative and its acts are treated as
such without reference to their nature or effect, basic constitutional protec-
tions could be circumvented by delineating any quasi-judicial function as
legislative in order to escape meaningful judicial scrutiny.8"
CONCLUSION
The fallacy of terming actions which balance individual rights with the
community interest in zoning regulations as legislative, thereby subject to
referendum and not subject to judicial scrutiny, is clear. Zoning legislation
differs significantly in function and administration from other laws. The
need for amendment to relieve individual hardship or incorporate timely
changes into the comprehensive land use plan is essential to the zoning
process. To obstruct change by use of mandatory referendum undercuts
the judicially accepted rationale of zoning flexibility for continuing rational
land use. To subject individual adjudication to majority interests negates the
constitutional safeguards which courts have engrafted on the zoning process,
and institutionalizes status quo land use and arbitrary change in develop-
ment patterns.
The flaws in legal reasoning incorporated in the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in Eastlake provided the United States Supreme Court with the
opportunity to reverse that decision by citing propositions of law contrary
to the Ohio Court's position. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court
failed to deal with the paramount underlying issues of the proper categoriza-
Associates, 42 Ohio St. 2d 263, 328 N.E.2d 395 (1975), which, while treating rezoning as
legislative, also cites to Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 519.12 (requiring notice and hearing if less
than 10 parcels are affected). Since legislative acts need not conform to such due process
standards, the treatment of rezoning as subject to such due process safeguards implies that
the action is administrative and quasi-judicial in nature. See also Cook-Johnson Realty Co.
v. Bertolini, 15 Ohio St. 2d 195, 239 N.E.2d 80 (1968) (Schnieder, J. dissenting); R. BAB-
COCK, THE ZONING GAME 158 (1966).
82 Woodlawn Area Citizen's Ass'n. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 187, 216 A.2d
149 (1966); Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). Specially con-
curring in Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 111. 2d 415, 424, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1962), Justice
Klingbiel stated:
If [a body] is acting in a legislative capacity it has no business deciding particular cases
at all .... Such activities are not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial
in character. To place them in the hands of legislative bodies, whose acts are not judi-
cially reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary government. . . . It is
because of this immunity from review that legislative bodies must confine themselves to
the prescribing of general rules.
83 26 Ill. 2d 415, 425, 186 N.E.2d 529, 534 (1962).
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tion of actions under zoning regulations and the proper use of referendum.
The lack of analysis of the effect of the provisions of the Eastlake charter on
the people is a significant defect in the decision.
Laws, including zoning regulations, should be enacted for the general
welfare and be applied fairly to the people they are promulgated to serve.
Laws which allow arbitrary results and impede the accomodation of growth
threaten the democratic process more severely than does the elimination of
mandatory referenda which may achieve an exclusionary or illegitimate goal.
In determining the constitutional validity of a law, its purpose and effect on
society should be analyzed. Adherence to legal principles in a vacuum
is meaningless.
ELIZABETH REILLY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Civil Rights Act - Section 1981 - Title VII - Reverse
Discrimination - Equal Protection
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S.Ct. 2574 (1976)
T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.' held that Title VIP prohibits racial discrimination
by both employers and unions against white persons upon the same standards
as it prohibits racial discrimination against nonwhites. The Court further
held that Section 19811 is applicable to racial discrimination in private
employment against white persons as well as nonwhites.
In McDonald, petitioners, two white employees of respondent trans-
1 96 S.Ct. 2574 (1976).
242 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1970), provides in part that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization .. . to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of
this section.
3 Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970), provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other. (emphasis added.)
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